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Abstract A great deal of research has focused on the question
of whether or not concepts are embodied as a rule. Supporters
of embodiment have pointed to studies that implicate affective
and sensorimotor systems in cognitive tasks, while critics of
embodiment have offered nonembodied explanations of these
results and pointed to studies that implicate amodal systems.
Abstract concepts have tended to be viewed as an important
test case in this polemical debate. This essay argues that we
need to move beyond a pretheoretical notion of abstraction.
Against the background of current research and theory, ab-
stract concepts do not pose a single, unified problem for em-
bodied cognition but, instead, three distinct problems: the
problem of generalization, the problem of flexibility, and the
problem of disembodiment. Identifying these problems pro-
vides a conceptual framework for critically evaluating, and
perhaps improving upon, recent theoretical proposals.
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For a long time, the orthodoxy within cognitive science held
that the human conceptual system was functionally distinct
from the perception, action, and emotion systems. Conceptual
knowledge was encoded in amodal symbols (i.e., representa-
tions that are not indigenous to any particular sensorimotor or
affective modality). In the past decade and a half, though, the
idea that concepts are in some significant sense grounded in
the brain mechanisms used to experience the world has gained
a great deal of currency. An important impetus for this shift
has been the emergence of an ever-increasing body of evi-
dence implicating perception, action, and emotion systems
in conceptual tasks (for reviews, see Fischer & Zwaan,
2008; Kemmerer, 2010; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012). This
has led to the development of an embodied view of concepts
in which affective and sensorimotor representations play a
central role (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005).
Our facility with abstract concepts such as ANIMAL,
DEMOCRACY, ODD NUMBER, ELECTRON, and TRUT
H poses a serious challenge to this view (Chatterjee, 2010;
Dove, 2009; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Weiskopf, 2007).
When this problem first emerged, many skeptics of embodied
cognition observed that most of the proffered evidence in-
volved concrete concepts. With time, though, the issues raised
by abstract concepts have become more complicated. First,
more research from an embodied and grounded perspective
has been carried out on abstract concepts (e.g., Barsalou &
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005; Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Glenberg
et al., 2008; Kousta, Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, & Del
Campo, 2011; Scorolli et al., 2011; Scorolli et al., 2012;
Vigliocco et al., 2014; Watson, Cardillo, Ianni, & Chatterjee,
2013). Second, there is a growing consensus that some kind of
hybrid account—based on such dichotomies as modal/
amodal, embodied/disembodied, and so forth—is needed
(e.g., Dove, 2009, 2011; Pulvermüller & Garagnani, 2014;
Reilly et al., 2014; Shallice & Cooper, 2013; Watson & Chat-
terjee, 2011; Zwaan, 2014). Both of these factors suggest that
now is the right time to reexamine abstract concepts. My aim
in this essay is to show that, when viewed against the back-
ground of current research and theory, they do not pose a
cohesive, unitary problem for embodied cognition (see also
Barsalou, 2010). In particular, I contend that they contribute
significantly to three conceptually distinct problems, which I
will refer to as the problem of generalization, the problem of
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flexibility, and the problem of disembodiment. My project is to
highlight issues that are already present, but not always iden-
tified, in the literature.
Conceptual grounding
Concepts aggregate information about category exemplars
that has become relevant or useful across different situations.
Consider the pedestrian concept DOG. Our experiences of
dogs often involve various forms of perceptual, motor, affec-
tive, social, and linguistic information. We see, touch, smell,
pet, love, fear, train, and talk about dogs. Where amodal and
embodied/grounded theories diverge is with respect to how
this information is represented. According to the former
models, it is encoded in amodal symbols contained within a
self-contained semantic memory system (J. R. Anderson,
1983). According to the latter, it is grounded in the systems
used to experience and interact with dogs. This would likely
include visual representations of size, shape, color, and move-
ment; tactile representations of fur; auditory representations of
barking and panting, affective representations associated with
interacting with dogs, and so on (Barsalou, 1999, 2008; Lynott
& Connell, 2010; Prinz, 2002). Conceptual representations,
by these lights, are distributed and multimodal. For the most
part, embodied theories also hold that concepts are tokened in
a context-dependent fashion, with only a subset of the avail-
able modal representations being retrieved on any given
occasion.
Although extensive reviews are available elsewhere (e.g.,
Fischer & Zwaan, 2008; Kemmerer, 2010; Kiefer &
Pulvermüller, 2012), it is worth surveying some of the evi-
dence in favor of modality-specific representations now, be-
cause I am going to survey some of the related, but divergent,
evidence in favor of amodal representations later. A caveat is
warranted, though. I am not going to offer a full defense of
conceptual grounding. Instead, working with the assumption
that this idea is attractive for a number of reasons, I am going
to examine the special problems posed by abstract concepts
for embodied cognition. It is worth emphasizing, though, that
these problems extend beyond embodied cognition. Indeed,
they apply to any approach that appeals to a notion of neural
reuse or Bborrowed cognition^ (Anderson, 2014).
Returning to the evidence for grounded cognition, a num-
ber of neuroimaging studies have seemed to implicate senso-
rimotor areas in conceptual processing. For example, the rec-
ognition of words highly associated with auditory features
(e.g., telephone) elicited activity in areas of the auditory asso-
ciation cortex that are active during sound perception (Kiefer,
Sim, Herrnberger, Grothe, & Hoenig, 2008). This activity was
not found with words highly associated with visual or motor
features. Event-related potentials (ERPs) recorded with the
same stimuli suggest that this increased activity begins around
150 ms after word onset (Kiefer et al., 2008). Taken together,
the fMRI and ERP data suggest that the response is both rapid
and selective. Supporters of embodiment argue that such ra-
pidity and selectivity suggest that this activity is causally rel-
evant to the semantic task, but others have pointed out that
noncausal explanations are possible. For example, this activity
could be the consequence of spreading activation initiated by
amodal conceptual processing (Mahon, 2015; Mahon &
Caramazza, 2008).
A number of studies have shown similar indications of
correlated activity in perceptual and conceptual tasks. Reading
action-related words and sentences produces increased activa-
tion in the cortical regions associated with performing the
relevant movements (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermüller,
2004; Tettamanti et al., 2005). Right- and left-handers have
been shown to exhibit increased activation in the premotor
areas that were contralateral to their dominant hands when
carrying out a lexical decision task on manual-action verbs
(Willems, Hagoort, & Casasanto, 2010). Reading odor-
related words (e.g., cinnamon) appears to elicit increased ac-
tivity in olfactory regions, when compared to neutral words
(Gonzalez et al., 2006). Simmons et al. (2007) provided evi-
dence of a shared neural substrate associated with the percep-
tion of color and a property verification task involving color
(e.g., taxi–yellow). Because this substrate involves an anterior
region of the left fusiform gyrus rather than a posterior region
(which is associated with low-level color perception), there is
some dispute concerning the degree to which it supports con-
ceptual grounding. Critics of grounding (e.g., Chatterjee,
2010; Mahon, 2015; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008) argue that
what the researchers actually found is shared activation in an
amodal area associated with conceptual processing that is near
to, but independent of, color perception areas. Simmons and
colleagues acknowledged this possibility, but argued that oth-
er evidence shows that the more anterior region plays a role in
higher-level color perception.
Behavioral studies have provided further indication that
our concepts are grounded in the perception, action, and
emotion systems. To give just a few examples, Pecher,
Zeelenberg, and Barsalou (2003; see also van Dantzig,
Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsalou, 2008) demonstrated a
modality-switching cost associated with a property verifica-
tion task: Participants verified verbally expressed facts involv-
ing one modality (leaves rustle) more rapidly after verifying a
fact involving the same modality (blenders make noise) than
after verifying a fact involving a different modality (cran-
berries are tart). Glenberg and Kaschak (2002) found a de-
crease in reaction times when the response direction (a button
pressed either away/toward the body) and the implied direc-
tion of action of the sentences (e.g., Andy gave you the pizza/
You gave Andy the pizza) were congruent. Borghi, Glenberg,
and Kaschak (2004) uncovered a similar action-compatibility
effect when participants were instructed to decide whether or
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not a word that followed a sentence named a part of the object
mentioned in the sentence. Half of the selected parts were
found in the upper portion of the object, and half were found
in the lower portion. The experimenters observed that re-
sponses were faster when the direction of the keypress move-
ment (upward or downward) matched the part location.
Kaschak and colleagues (2005) found that watching upward
or downward motion slowed the semantic processing of
sentences describing motion in the same direction (see also
Meteyard, Bahrami, & Vigliocco, 2007). There is an active
discussion among researchers concerning why congruency
can lead to facilitation in some tasks and interference in others
(Willems & Francken, 2012).
The evidence from neuropsychology is equivocal (Mahon,
2015; McCaffrey, 2015). On the one hand, damage to the
auditory association cortex has been linked to impairment of
the processing of sound-related concepts (Trumpp, Kliese,
Hoenig, Haarmeier, & Kiefer, 2013). Similarly, a selective
deficit in action-concept processing has also been found in
patients with apraxia (Buxbaum & Saffran 2002), motor neu-
ron disease (Bak, O’Donovan, Xuereb, Boniface, & Hodges,
2001) and Parkinson’s (Boulenger et al., 2008; Fernandino
et al., 2012; Fernandino et al., 2013). On the other hand, it
seems much more common to find preserved conceptual pro-
cessing in the face of damage to action-related sensorimotor
areas (Johnson-Frey, 2004; Mahon & Caramazza, 2005).
Binder and Desai (2011, p. 531) drew the following conclu-
sion from their review of the extant evidence: Bconceptual
deficits in patients with sensory–motor impairments, when
present, tend to be subtle rather than catastrophic.^ As I will
discuss in subsequent sections, the multifaceted nature of the
neuropsychological evidence is a driving force behind recent
attempts to adopt hybrid modal/amodal approaches to seman-
tic memory.
Some transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) research
supports grounding. For instance, Pulvermüller, Hauk,
Nikulin, and Ilmoniemi (2005) carried out an rTMS study in
which they weakly stimulated different parts of the motor
system while participants performed a lexical decision task
on arm- and leg-related action words. Response times in-
creased with arm-related words when there was weak stimu-
lation of left hemisphere areas associated with armmovement,
and response times increased with leg-related words when
there was weak stimulation of motor areas associated with
leg movement, but response times were not modulated in a
control condition with sham stimulation.
We should remain circumspect with respect to this body of
evidence, for a number of reasons. Viewed charitably, it im-
plicates modality-specific representations in our concepts.
Even from this charitable perspective, though, several caveats
are warranted. First, this evidence falls well short of showing
that modality-specific representations are necessary for con-
ceptual processing. Second, it does not exclude amodal
representations—particularly when one considers the possi-
bility that some of the results might involve amodal areas that
are near to perception or action areas (Chatterjee, 2010;
Mahon, 2015; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008; Weiskopf,
2007). Finally, because the relevant studies overwhelmingly
rely on concrete or highly imageable concepts, the status of
abstract concepts remains very much in question (Chatterjee,
2010; Dove, 2009, 2011; Mahon & Caramazza, 2008).
Problem 1: Generalization
The main thesis of this essay is that abstract concepts pose
three distinct problems for embodied and grounded cognition.
The first I will refer to as the problem of generalization. With-
in cognitive psychology, conceptual generalization can be un-
derstood in both a horizontal and a vertical sense. The hori-
zontal sense concerns the extension of concepts to include
new exemplars, whereas the vertical sense concerns the crea-
tion of conceptual hierarchies in which superordinate concepts
are more general than subordinate ones (Rosch, 1978). For
example, we can situate a basic-level concept like DOG with-
in a hierarchy in which PUG is more specific and MAMMAL
is more general. Although distinct, these two senses of gener-
alization are clearly related to each other, because both con-
cern how we are able to represent information about the world
that goes beyond our immediate experience. The first sense of
generalization treats this as universal problem for concepts,
and the second highlights the fact that the problem may be
more acute for some concepts than others.
It is not uncommon to define abstract concepts in terms of
generalization understood in a vertical sense. Researchers in
epigenetic robotics, for instance, explicitly characterize them
as Bhigher-order^ concepts (Cangelosi & Riga, 2006;
Stramandinoli, Marocco, & Cangelosi, 2012; Thill, Pado, &
Ziemke, 2014). Others disagree. Borghi and Binkofski (2014),
for instance, suggested that we need to distinguish abstract-
ness from mere abstraction. Some examples may help to elu-
cidate this distinction. A concept such as MAMMAL may sit
at the top of an abstraction hierarchy, and is thus more abstract
than related lower-order concepts, but its referents are never-
theless concrete, perceivable objects. A concept like ODD
NUMBER, on the other hand, is abstract because its referents
are not concrete, perceivable objects but, instead, something
more ephemeral. Borghi and Binkofski contended that ab-
stractness, not abstraction, is the real problem posed by ab-
stract concepts. This essay takes a different stance, and views
abstraction and abstractness as related but distinct problems
posed by abstract concepts. The former is associated with the
problem of generalization, and the latter is associated with the
problem of disembodiment.
Some researchers contend that fully grounded theories are
not up to the task of addressing the problem of generalization.
Psychon Bull Rev (2016) 23:1109–1121 1111
Patterson, Nestor, and Rogers (2007, p. 977), for instance,
wrote: BIf semantic memory consisted only of the modality-
specific content of objects (and the links between them), it is
doubtful that we could ever achieve the higher-order general-
izations on which so much of our semantic processing relies.^
Conceptually, amodal representations provide an effective
means of integrating information from multiple sources
(Dove, 2009; Machery, 2007). In keeping with this, a contro-
versy has arisen concerning whether or not theories of embod-
ied cognition should make room for them. Meteyard,
Cuadrado, Bahrami, and Vigliocco (2012) suggested that we
can place different variants of embodied cognition along a
continuum ranging from the strongly to the weakly embodied:
At the strongly embodied end are theories that fully limit
cognition to action, emotion, and perception systems (e.g.,
Gallese & Lakoff, 2005; Glenberg & Gallese, 2012;
Pulvermüller, 2001); at the weakly embodied end are theories
that see the activation of sensorimotor areas as a secondary
consequence of cognitive processing handled by amodal areas
(e.g., Chatterjee, 2010; Mahon, 2015; Mahon & Caramazza,
2008); and in between are theories that advocate for some sort
of intermediate position at which concepts are at least partially
grounded in action and perception systems (e.g., Binder &
Desai, 2011; Simmons & Barsalou, 2003; Vigliocco, Vinson,
Lewis, & Garrett, 2004).
Two bodies of evidence seem to implicate amodal repre-
sentations in semantic memory. The first involves neuropsy-
chological patients with disorders such as semantic dementia
(SD). SD is characterized by a gradual bilateral atrophy of the
temporal lobes and a concomitant progressive loss of semantic
memory for common objects (Hodges, Bozeat, Lambon
Ralph, Patterson, & Spatt, 2000; Lambon Ralph, McClelland,
Patterson, Galton, & Hodges, 2001; Lambon Ralph, Sage,
Jones, & Mayberry, 2010; Patterson, Graham, & Hodges,
1994). SD patients often exhibit degraded knowledge of sev-
eral items within a larger category, but have preserved knowl-
edge for others. For example, a patient who was assessed
longitudinally initially had trouble in a picture-naming task
with the concepts EAGLE and OSTRICH, but not with
CHICKEN, DUCK, and SWAN (Hodges, Graham, &
Patterson, 1995; Patterson et al., 2007). The deficit associated
with these items is typically cross-modal (Bozeat, Lambon
Ralph, Patterson, Garrard, & Hodges, 2000; Garrard & Car-
roll, 2006; McCaffrey & Machery, 2012). Remarkably, the
degradation of semantic knowledge in SD often proceeds in
a hierarchical fashion. For example, as the patient mentioned
above gradually lost the ability to identify more and more bird
species, she remained able to identify most of them as birds or
animals (Hodges et al., 1995; Patterson et al., 2007).
The second body of evidence involves neurotypical partic-
ipants. Some research in cognitive neuroscience suggests that
amodal representations might be important to semantic mem-
ory. To give an example, stimulating anterior temporal areas
with TMS leads to decreased efficiency with respect to
semantic-processing tasks (Pobric, Jefferies, & Lambon
Ralph, 2010). Although this decreased performance falls well
short of the catastrophic semantic impairments found in SD
patients, it does implicate the anterior temporal lobes in se-
mantic processing. Other studies have implicated other poten-
tially amodal areas. Binder, Desai, Graves, and Conant
(2009), for example, carried out a meta-analysis of 120 neu-
roimaging studies that contrasted semantic and nonsemantic
control tasks and found that several heteromodal areas in left
temporal and parietal cortex were regularly engaged by these
tasks. In sum, a plethora of non-modality-specific areas have
been implicated in semantic processing.
Evidence of the sort outlined above is often seen as either a
vindication of a traditional amodal approach or as demonstra-
tion of the need for a hybrid approach. Recently, a particular
class of intermediate theories has become popular. These ex-
pand on the notion of convergence zones (Damasio &
Damasio, 1994) and posit amodal Bhubs^ that radiate to
modality-specific Bspokes^ in sensorimotor areas (Lambon
Ralph, Pobric, & Jefferies, 2009; Patterson et al., 2007). One
of the more influential of these hub-and-spoke theories locates
a core, amodal hub for conceptual processing bilaterally in the
anterior temporal lobes (Jefferies & Lambon Ralph, 2006;
Lambon Ralph et al., 2010; Pobric et al., 2010). Related the-
ories have identified several hubs and offer a more dynamic
view of the interaction between amodal and modality-specific
systems (Binder & Desai, 2011; Reilly et al., 2014; Reilly &
Peelle, 2008; Reilly, Rodriguez, Peelle, & Grossman, 2011;
Watson & Chatterjee, 2011).
This essay is not the place to settle the ongoing debate
between stronger and weaker approaches to embodied cogni-
tion. Certainly, many think that abstract concepts can be han-
dled without amodal representations (e.g., Gallese & Lakoff,
2005; Vigliocco et al., 2014; Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons,
Martin, & Barsalou, 2013). What seems clear, though, is that
the issue of generalization has become a battleground in this
debate. One of the central issues is whether neuropsycholog-
ical disorders such as SD, which involves cross-modal deficits
and progresses in hierarchical fashion, suggest that amodal
hubs play a significant role in semantic memory (McCaffrey,
2015; McCaffrey & Machery, 2012; Patterson et al., 2007;
Reilly et al., 2014).
Problem 2: Flexibility
From a grounded perspective—in which physical environ-
ments, situations, states of the body, and current tasks are all
influences on our how concepts are realized—concepts are
often treated as being inherently flexible. Barsalou (1999,
2008, 2012), to give an example, consistently emphasizes
the situated nature of concepts. Lebois, Wilson-Mendenhall,
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and Barsalou (2014) contended that the activation of grounded
features of concepts varies dynamically with context. Connell
and Lynott (2014) contended that the dynamic influences that
the body, the environment, the relevant goals, and the task
have on our conceptual representations imply that Byou can’t
represent the same concept twice.^A. D.Wilson and Golonka
(2013) maintained that task-dependence is a key feature of
embodied cognition. The problem of flexibility arises because
there is good reason to think that embodied representations
can be engaged to a greater or lesser degree depending on a
number of factors, including not only the context, current
goals, and task, but also the relative abstractness of the con-
cepts involved.
For some time, there has been some indication that embod-
ied representations may not be necessary for all conceptual
processing. For example, patients with SD and Alzheimer’s
disease can show action-word deficits despite the relative
preservation of frontal areas associated with motor planning
(Druks et al., 2006; Reilly, Cross, Troiani, & Grossman, 2007;
Yi, Moore, & Grossman, 2007). Research now indicates that
context may determine whether or not sensorimotor systems
are engaged with individual concepts. In other words, it ap-
pears that some individual concepts can be used in either a
more or a less grounded fashion, depending on the
circumstances.
Metaphoric language is a useful testing ground for this
idea, because it uses words that typically express concrete
contents to express more abstract contents. Some of the rele-
vant research has focused on motor and visual areas that ap-
pear to be engaged during certain conceptual tasks. For exam-
ple, a number of studies have shown that effector-specific
motor and premotor areas are engaged by action words asso-
ciated with particular body parts (for reviews, see Kemmerer,
2010; Kiefer & Pulvermüller, 2012; Willems & Casasanto,
2011). Similarly, studies have also indicated that areas associ-
ated with visual motion can be engaged by action words or
action sentences (Kable, Kan, Wilson, Thompson-Schill, &
Chatterjee, 2005; Kable, Lease-Spellmeyer, & Chatterjee,
2002; Saygin, McCullough, Alac, & Emmorey, 2010). Some
research has indicated that the effector-specific activations as-
sociated with the semantic processing of action words does
not appear if the words are used in metaphors (Aziz-Zadeh,
Wilson, Rizzolatti, & Iacoboni, 2006) or idioms (Raposo,
Moss, Stamatakis, & Tyler, 2009). Building on the finding
that sentences describing upward or downward motion can
interfere with the shape perception of a visual object presented
in the relevant region (Richardson, Spivey, Barsalou, &
McCrae, 2003), Bergen, Lindsay, Matlock, and Narayanan
(2007) carried out a number of experiments with three differ-
ent types of sentences. They found interference effects with
literal motion sentences, but not with metaphorical motion
sentences or abstract sentences. Saygin, McCullough, Alac,
and Emmorey (2010) carried out an fMRI experiment in
which they compared motion sentences (The wild horse
crossed the barren field), fictive motion sentences (The hiking
trail crossed the barren field), and static sentences. Motion-
sensitive visual areas were activated significantly more with
the motion sentences than the other two sentence types, but
they were also more active with the fictive sentences than they
were with the static ones. In a similar vein, Desai, Conant,
Binder, Park, and Seidenberg (2013) compared the neural re-
sponses to three analogous types of sentences: those express-
ing Bliteral^ action (the daughter grasped the flowers), those
expressing Bmetaphoric^ action (the public grasped the idea),
and those expressing Babstract^ action (the public understood
the idea). Two of their findings are relevant to our present
concerns. First, in the Bliteral^ and Bmetaphoric^ conditions,
they found that the degree of activity in primary motor and
visual motion areas was inversely correlated with the famil-
iarity ratings of the sentences. Second, in the Bmetaphor^ and
Babstract^ conditions, they found increased activation in left
temporal regions. They suggested that these findings fit with
both the proposal that metaphors undergo a gradual abstrac-
tion process as they gain familiarity (Bowdle & Gentner,
2005) and the proposal that our understanding of metaphors
depends in part on amodal systems.
It should be noted that a supporter of an amodal approach
might take the findings of decreased activation with fictive
and metaphoric contexts as supporting their claim that senso-
rimotor activation during conceptual tasks is epiphenomenal.
The possible need for a more nuanced solution to the problem
of flexibility is suggested by a recent study comparing patients
with Parkinson’s disease to age-matched controls, which
showed a selective impairment for the semantic processing
of literal action sentences and idiomatic action sentences, but
no impairment for the semantic processing of nonidiomatic
metaphoric action sentences and abstract sentences
(Fernandino et al., 2013).
This research on metaphor highlights how the problem of
flexibility might apply to a particular domain, but it is not the
only research area where this pattern emerges. For instance,
sentences from second-person perspectives (You gave a pizza
to Louis) but not sentences from third-person perspectives
(Lea gave a pizza to Louis) generated an action-
compatibility effect (Gianelli, Farnè, Salemme, Jeannerod, &
Roy, 2011). Similarly, motor-evoked potentials have been
found to increase for first-person but not for third-person ac-
tion verbs (Papeo, Corradi-Dell’Acqua, & Rumiati, 2011).
Coming at the issue of flexibility from a different angle, there
is evidence that larger narratives can selectively engage
grounded representations (Chow et al., 2014; Kurby & Zacks,
2013).
As was true with the problem of generalization, the prob-
lem of flexibility figures prominently in some recent theoret-
ical reassessments of embodied cognition. After highlighting
the variability of the extant evidence, Willems and Francken
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(2012) suggested that we need to go beyond the embodied/
disembodied dichotomy and develop explicit theories
concerning the relative contributions of embodied representa-
tions. Others have contended that we need to reevaluate em-
bodied cognition and recognize that different conceptual tasks
may involve different degrees of embodiment (Pulvermuller
& Garagnani, 2014; Watson & Chatterjee, 2011; Zwaan,
2014). Wellsby and Pexman (2014) suggested that sensorimo-
tor representations may even play different roles at different
stages of development.
Problem 3: Disembodiment
The third problem posed by abstract concepts emerges be-
cause they appear to be qualitatively different from other con-
cepts. It is just difficult to see how representations grounded in
sensorimotor systems can, even in principle, capture the con-
tent of abstract concepts such as ODD NUMBER, JUSTICE,
and TRUTH. Nomatter how these concepts are realized in the
brain, these categories are in some important sense divorced
from experiential factors. They appear to be disembodied.
Even those who claim that abstract concepts are fully ground-
ed acknowledge that such examples present a special chal-
lenge. For instance, Wilson-Mendenhall, Simmons, Martin,
and Barsalou (2013, p. 921) explained, Btheories of grounded
cognition suggest that individual abstract concepts are repre-
sented by distributed neural patterns that reflect their unique
content, which is often more situationally complex and tem-
porally extended than that of concrete concepts.^ Borghi and
Binkofski (2014) offered a broad operational definition of
abstract concepts. According to this definition, abstract con-
cepts tend to refer to events, mental states, and situations rath-
er than concrete, manipulable objects or entities; to involve
more complex properties and relations than concrete concepts;
and to be semantically more variable. The difficulty in captur-
ing concepts with this cluster of features is what I am calling
the problem of disembodiment.
A longstanding and diverse body of evidence suggests that
abstract concepts are processed in a functionally and
neuroanatomically different way than other concepts (with
the caveat that the difference may be a matter of a degree
rather than a straightforward dichotomy). Concreteness or
imageability effects were an early indication of this difference.
Concreteness is typically defined as the extent to which an
item or event can be experienced by the senses, and
imageability is typically defined in terms of the subjective
ease with which a word gives rise to sensorimotor mental
imagery. Because these two measures overlap to a great de-
gree, researchers have tended to treat them as interchangeable
(although see Vigliocco, Vinson, Druks, Barber, & Cappa,
2011, for a discussion of their differences). In general,
concrete/high-imageable words exhibit a number of
processing advantages over abstract/low-imageable words
(Paivio, 1986; Wattennmaker & Shoben, 1987). More recent-
ly, a motor-related measure has been used to similar effect.
The dimension of body–object interaction (BOI) is meant to
capture the ease with which a human body can physically
interact with category exemplars. A number of studies have
indicated that words with higher BOI ratings are processed
more efficiently than words with lower BOI ratings (Siakaluk
et al., 2008; Wellsby, Siakaluk, Owen, & Pexman, 2011; Yap,
Pexman, Wellsby, Hargreaves, & Huff, 2012).
Evidence from cognitive neuroscience broadly supports a
neurophysiological distinction between abstract/low-
imageable and concrete/high-imageable concepts. For in-
stance, Adorni and Proverbio (2012) applied LORETA source
reconstruction to an ERP experiment involving a lexical deci-
sion task and found evidence of increased activation of the left
medial frontal gyrus and the left temporal cortex, as well as
decreased activation of extrastriate visual areas, with abstract
relative to concrete words (see Lehmann, Pascual-Marqui,
Strik, & Koenig, 2010, for similar findings using different
tasks). In another ERP study, distinct concreteness effects
were elicited in the left and right hemispheres (Huang, Lee,
& Federmeier, 2010). A number of neuroimaging studies have
shown that superior regions of the left temporal lobe (Binder,
Westbury, McKiernan, Possing, & Medler, 2005; Giesbrecht,
Gamblin, & Swaab, 2004; Mellet, Tzourio, Denis, &
Mazoyer, 1998; Noppeney & Price, 2004; Sabsevitz,
Medler, Seidenberg, & Binder, 2005) and inferior regions of
the left prefrontal cortex (Binder et al., 2005; Giesbrecht et al.,
2004; Goldberg, Perfetti, & Schneider, 2006; Noppeney &
Price, 2004; Sabsevitz et al., 2005) are activated to a greater
degree by tasks involving abstract concepts. Although there is
some variability in the imaging data taken as whole, recent
meta-analyses have shown that these areas are the most likely
to show increased activation with abstract concepts (Binder,
Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009; Wang, Conder, Blitzer, &
Shinkareva, 2010). In a recent study, Sakreida et al. (2013)
presented simple sentences that contained pairs of abstract,
concrete, or mixed (abstract–concrete and concrete–abstract)
words and found that the fully abstract pairs engaged the left
middle temporal gyrus, whereas the fully concrete pairs en-
gaged a fronto-parietal network.
Neuropsychological research provides further reason to
suppose that abstract/low-imageable and concrete/high-
imageable concepts are partially supported by distinct neuro-
logical systems. A greater impairment for the processing of
abstract words has been correlated with left hemisphere dam-
age, including patients who present with aphasia (Goodglass,
Hyde, & Blumsten, 1969), deep dyslexia (Coltheart,
Patterson, & Marshall, 1980; Franklin, Howard, & Patterson,
1995; Shallice & Warrington, 1975), and deep dysphasia
(Katz & Goodglass, 1990; Martin & Saffran, 1992). Interest-
ingly, some patients with SD can exhibit a contrasting
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impairment for concrete/high-imageable words (Reilly &
Peelle, 2008; Yi et al., 2007). There is an active discussion
among researchers concerning whether (e.g., Bonner et al.,
2009) or not (e.g., Hoffman & Lambon Ralph, 2011) this
reversal is a typical feature of SD. A recent study of healthy
participants also supports an abstract/concrete asymmetry.
Papagno, Fogliata, Catricala, and Miniussi (2009) found that
accuracy on a lexical decision task decreased with abstract
concepts when rTMS was applied over the left inferior frontal
gyrus and the left superior temporal gyrus, but accuracy de-
creased with concrete concepts when rTMS was applied over
the right superior temporal gyrus.
Ultimately, there is ongoing debate concerning how to han-
dle the problem of disembodiment. Some maintain that a fully
embodied solution is possible, while others maintain that an
alternative solution is needed. There is general agreement,
however, that fully abstract concepts represent a special chal-
lenge for embodied cognition.
Do multiple problems require multiple solutions?
Thus far I have argued that abstract concepts pose at least three
distinct problems for grounded cognition: the problems of
generalization, flexibility, and disembodiment. Although this
trifurcation does not in and of itself mean that a single theory
cannot address all three problems, it does raise the possibility
that more than one theory may be required. Once we move
beyond a pretheoretical notion of abstractness and look at the
specific issues engendered by the diverse bodies of research
on abstract concepts, we are in a better position to assess and
develop our theories. To see this, consider some of the recent
theoretical proposals and their potentials with respect to solv-
ing the problems outlined in this essay:
Conceptual metaphor Cognitive linguists (e.g., Lakoff,
1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) have proposed that we often
understand abstract concepts metaphorically in terms of expe-
riential concepts. This is supported by some behavioral research
from an embodied and grounded perspective (reviewed by
Gibbs, 2006). For instance, Boroditsky and colleagues
(Boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & Boroditsky,
2008) provided evidence that some temporal judgments rely
on spatial representations. However, there is reason to suspect
that the explanatory scope of this approach is likely to be lim-
ited. First, conceptual metaphors do not seem well suited to
addressing the problem of generalization, because this problem
arises in nonmetaphoric contexts. Second, some of the evidence
reviewed above suggests that it is not the case that all meta-
phoric language engages action and perception systems. Con-
ceptual metaphors are thus unlikely even to be able to explain
all metaphoric language. Third, although conceptual metaphors
have some promise with respect to the problem of
disembodiment, it is far from clear that all abstract concepts
can be accounted for in terms of conceptual metaphors.
Embodied dual-code theories Recently, several embodied
versions of dual-code theory (Paivio, 1986) have been offered.
According to the language-and-situated-simulation (LASS)
theory (Barsalou, Santos, Simmons, & Wilson, 2008), lan-
guage comprehension involves the continuous interaction be-
tween the processing of linguistic forms and situated simula-
tions. Another example is the word-as-tool (WAT) theory
(Borghi & Binkofski, 2014; Borghi & Cimatti, 2009). In
WAT, linguistic forms are not merely a means of engaging
simulations but, instead, a means of leveraging our social ex-
perience. Abstract concepts require longer-lasting social inter-
action than concrete concepts to be acquired, and this leads to
their greater reliance on linguistic simulations (Borghi &
Binkofski, 2014; Scorolli et al., 2011). These theories share
the idea that internalized language serves as an additional
conceptual format (see also Cangelosi & Riga, 2006; Paivio,
2013; Vygotsky, 2012). The symbolic properties of language
could help explain how we are able to handle disembodied
content (Clark, 2008; Dove, 2014). Language-based cognition
could also provide partial solution to the problem of flexibility
by explaining how conventional or Bdead^ metaphors work
without the engagement the sensorimotor representations as-
sociated with their Bliteral^ reading. The ability to affix arbi-
trary labels to categories is also likely to help us acquire
higher-order concepts (Cangelosi & Riga, 2006; Carey &
Sarnecka, 2006; Dehaene, Spelke, Pinel, Stanescu, & Tviskin,
1999). However, given that generalization seems possible in
the absence of labels, this approach may not offer a full solu-
tion to the problem of generalization.
Embodied/distributional hybrids There have been a num-
ber of recent attempts to merge embodied and distributional
approaches to semantic memory (Andrews, Frank, &
Vigliocco, 2014; Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009;
Louwerse, 2011; Lourwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008; Riordan &
Jones, 2010; Vigliocco, Meteyard, Andrews, & Kousta,
2009; Vigliocco, Vinson, Lewis, & Garrett, 2004). Perhaps
the greatest impetus for such accounts is the promise they have
with respect to the problem of disembodiment. Distributional
models that rely on language-based information seem to be
particularly adept at handling abstract content (Louwerse,
2011; Louwerse & Jeuniaux, 2008), but they struggle to ad-
dress the grounding problem (Harnad, 1990). For this reason,
a hybrid approach seems particularly promising. Some recent
evidence supports this impression. To give an example, An-
drews, Vigliocco, and Vinson (2009) found that the perfor-
mance of a model that combined experiential and language-
based distributional data correlated with the behavioral data
from several tasks better than the performance of models that
used only one type. Although this model only involves
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distinct types of information (and is thus compatible with a
purely amodal approach; see Machery, 2007), it fits well with
theories that posit distinct types of conceptual representations.
Less work has connected this sort of approach to the problems
of flexibility and generalization, but such a connection does
have some initial plausibility. For one thing, this approach
provides a framework for explaining flexibility, because cer-
tain tasks and contexts could rely on one type of representa-
tion more than the other. For another, mixed embodied/
distributional concepts could explain how abstraction that falls
short of abstractness is possible.
Emotions Controlling for age of acquisition, context avail-
ability, familiarity, imageability, and other variables, Kousta,
Vigliocco, Vinson, Andrews, and Del Campo (2011) found
that abstract words have a reaction time advantage over con-
crete words (reversing the usual concreteness effect). Building
on an earlier finding that emotional valence facilitated lexical
processing (Kousta, Vinson, & Vigliocco, 2009; see also
Newcombe, Campbell, Siakaluk, & Pexman, 2012), they the-
orized that this advantage might be due to the overall tendency
for abstract concepts to have greater emotional content (for
neuroimaging evidence that fits with these claims, see
Vigliocco et al., 2014). These intriguing results may pave
the way for a more fully embodied response to the problem
of disembodiment. Indeed they appear to show that concepts
that we had previously viewed as disembodied are in fact
grounded to some degree. What they do not show, however,
is that all abstract concepts can be handled in this way (Dove,
2014; Shallice & Cooper, 2013). Furthermore, while increas-
ing the prominence of emotional content in abstract concepts
may provide a partial solution to the problem of
disembodiment, it is difficult to see how it would provide a
meaningful solution to the problems of generalization and
flexibility. For instance, it is not likely to explain how we are
able to possess higher-order concepts such asMAMMAL. It is
also not likely to explain why sensorimotor systems appear to
be robustly engaged in some conceptual contexts but not in
others.
Hub-and-spoke theories As was outlined above, working
from neuroimaging and neuropsychological case studies, a
number of researchers have speculated that concepts rely on
both modality-specific systems and amodal hubs. Although
this newly dominant approach remains somewhat
underspecified and hampered by disagreements concerning
the number and location of such hubs, it has some promise
with respect to each of the three problems. We have already
seen that it has largely been developed in the context of the
problem of generalization, but there are reasons to think that it
could be extended to the other problems. Perhaps flexibility is
the result of the differential engagement of the Bspokes^ by
task and context. Analogously, disembodiment might be
explained in terms of the relative influences of Bhubs.^ More
research is clearly needed, and the question of how this ap-
proach might (or might not) mesh with other hybrid ap-
proaches remains.
Multidimensional theories A number of studies have indi-
cated that words with more associated semantic information
are processed more efficiently in word recognition tasks than
words with less associated semantic information (for a review,
see Pexman, 2012). Such semantic-richness effects have been
found in relation to several dimensions (e.g., Buchanan,
Westbury, & Burgess, 2001; Duñabeitia, Avilés, & Carreiras,
2008; Grondin, Lupker, & McRae, 2009; Schwanenflugel &
Shoben, 1983), and this has led some researchers to offer
multidimensional accounts of conceptual structure (e.g.,
Pexman, Hargreaves, Siakaluk, Bodner, & Pope, 2008; Yap
et al., 2012). Recently, this approach has been extended to
abstract concepts. For instance, Zdrazilova and Pexman
(2013) examined the effects of six semantic-richness variables
(context availability, sensory experience rating, emotional va-
lence, emotional arousal, semantic neighborhood, and number
of associates) on a lexical-decision task and a semantic-
categorization task. They found that the effects varied with
the task: Context availability facilitated lexical decision, and
both sensory experience and positive valence facilitated
semantic categorization. From this result, Zdrazilova and
Pexman (2013, p. 1316) concluded that abstract meaning
may be in part grounded in Bsituations, emotions, and sensory
experience.^ In another study, Moffat, Siakaluk, Sidhu, and
Pexman (2015) compared the effects of emotional experience
and context availability on a semantic-categorization task.
Emotional experience facilitated the processing of abstract
words but inhibited the processing of concrete words, whereas
context availability facilitated both. One of the important fea-
tures of the semantic-richness research is that the effects asso-
ciated with different dimensions are often task-dependent
(Hargreaves & Pexman, 2012; Moffat et al., 2015; Siakaluk,
Knol, & Pexman, 2014; Zdrazilova & Pexman, 2013).
Troche, Crutch, and Reilly (2014) have offered a different
defense of a multidimensional approach to abstract concepts.
Rather than rely on an intuitive notion of abstractness, they
investigated how the meanings of 400 concrete and abstract
English nouns are distributed in a multidimensional space
using hierarchical cluster analysis. Participants rated the nouns
along 12 dimensions. Factor reduction yielded three latent
factors that the authors characterize as affective association,
perceptual salience, and magnitude. When the original words
were plotted for these three factors, abstract and concrete
words were associated with unique, but somewhat overlap-
ping, topographies within this space.
Although much more work needs to be done from within
multidimensional frameworks, these examples demonstrate
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the promise that such frameworks have for helping us evaluate
and possibly integrate the theories outlined above as we ad-
dress the problems of generalization, flexibility, and
disembodiment.
Conclusion
Traditionally, cognitive science has examined our concepts
from a computational perspective that views cognition as be-
ing functionally independent from perception and action (Hur-
ley, 2008). Embodied cognition offers an alternative frame-
work, one that views cognition as being fundamentally
grounded in sensory and motor systems. In this heterogeneous
and constantly evolving research program (Barsalou, 2008;
Gibbs, 2006; Wilson, 2002), abstract concepts have been seen
as an important challenge. In this essay, I have argued that
abstract concepts pose three separate problems for embodied
cognition: the problem of generalization, the problem of flex-
ibility, and the problem of disembodiment. Recognizing that
these problems should not be conflated will hopefully facili-
tate the development of more robust embodied theories of
concepts.
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